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the foundation of ‘Global Britain’ 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, I advance understandings of the coloniality of British citizenship through the 
close examination of the status of the people of Hong Kong in Britain’s immigration and 
nationality legislation, a case has been overlooked in most social scientific analysis of 
Britain’s citizenship-migration nexus. The paper responds to Gurminder Bhambra’s (2015) 
call to recognise the connected sociologies and histories of citizenship, the analysis 
informed by the close reading of historical changes in legislation—from decolonisation and 
the making of the British nation-state to the post-Brexit construction of ‘Global Britain’—
and what these meant for the people of Hong Kong. In dialogue with scholarship focused on 
the enduring colonial ties in present-day citizenship and migration regimes, I offer an 
analysis inspired by Manuela Boatcă’s (2021a) coloniality of citizenship and Ann Laura 
Stoler’s (2016) understanding of exception by design, imperial forms of governance 
producing differential rights within national populations that positioned some populations 
as ambiguous. Conceptualising the status Hong Kongers in British legislation past and 
present as ambiguous by design, I question what the rhetoric of the Hong Kongers as ‘good 
migrants’ for global Britain’ at the heart of the promotion of the bespoke Hong Kong British 
Nationals (Overseas) (HK BN(O)) visa launched early 2021 conceals from view. As I argue, 
rather than a case apart in the context of increasingly restrictive immigration controls, the 
renewal of Britain’s obligations, commitments, and responsibilities to the people of Hong 
Kong through this visa scheme provide further evidence of the enduring colonial 
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Hong Kongers and the coloniality of British citizenship from Britain’s decolonisation to 
Brexit and the foundation of ‘Global Britain’ 
 
My grandmother was born in Hong Kong in 1928, the third child of the third generation of 
her family born in the (then) colonial city. A Cantonese speaker and Muslim resident of 
Hong Kong, for the first twenty years of her life she shared a status with other people across 
the British empire: British subject. She died a full British citizen, likely because of her 
marriage to my UK-born grandfather. Importantly, her acquisition of British citizenship was 
at odds with changes in British nationality and immigration legislation over the course of her 
lifetime. Others like her, including her siblings—people born in Hong Kong in the first half of 
the twentieth century—had found themselves re-categorised in British law four times, a 
protracted process in which they were repositioned as belonging to, but not part of, Britain; 
nationals without rights to full membership of the political community.1 This brief sketch 
illustrates the dynamism of British nationality and immigration legislation, the historical 
contingencies of individual status and the linguistic, ethnic and religious diversity of British 
subjects at an earlier point in its imperial history.  
 
In this paper, I advance understandings of the coloniality of British citizenship, a concept 
that communicates enduring colonial entanglements at the heart of Britain’s contemporary 
citizenship-migration nexus. I argue that it is through close observation of the production 
and transformation of the so-called ‘residual categories’ in operation in British nationality 
legislation—British Nationals (Overseas) (BN(O)), British Dependent Territories Citizens 
(BDTC) and British Overseas Citizens—that this is most evident. These legal statuses were 




they confer their holders with a nominal status as British nationals, but without the right to 
reside in the UK, making them aliens for the purpose of the UK’s immigration controls.  
 
I examine the BN(O) category, the status uniquely awarded to the people of Hong Kong 
when its sovereignty was transferred from Britain to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 
1997.  Despite being one of the largest populations impacted by successive changes in 
legislation over the second half of the twentieth century, social scientific and legal analyses 
of the development of British nationality and immigration law have largely overlooked this 
case. The recent introduction of the Hong Kong British Nationals (Overseas) (HK BN(O)) 
visa—a bespoke route for some Hong Kongers to migrate to and settle in the UK, which 
opened for applications on 31 January 2021—rests upon this residual status. As I argue, the 
HK BN(O) visa is the latest chapter in the longer history of Britain’s relationship to the 
people of Hong Kong. Close examination of changes in their status from colonisation, 
through Britain’s decolonisation, to the Sino-British Joint Declaration (JD) and 1997, reveals 
a habitual and longstanding presentation of the provisions made for them as a case apart in 
the broader context of Britain’s evolving citizenship-migration nexus, the Hong Kongers 
emerging as the perennial exception to the rule. The HK BN(O) visa is the latest articulation 
this longer history, these 2021 provisions singled out as an example of the UK Government’s 
‘fair and generous’ approach to immigration, seemingly at odds with an immigration regime 
that the government claim is ‘tough on immigration’.  
 
I argue that we need to question what this discourse and rhetoric of exceptionality conceals 
from view. This is not an easy story to tell; along with many other people, part of me wants 




those seeking to leave Hong Kong SAR (HKSAR) but also to those of us staunchly opposed to 
the increasingly exclusionary and brutal conditions of the UK’s migration governance, 
legislation, and policy. However, by recognising the longstanding presentation of the Hong 
Kongers as exception, new sight lines onto the coloniality of British citizenship are opened 
which reveal that not all is as it seems.  
 
In what follows, I recover historical Britain’s relationship to the people of Hong Kong from 
the margins to the centre to show how they have been transformed from British subjects to 
‘good migrants’ for Global Britain. In this way, I make visible how Britain’s framings of its 
obligations, commitments, and responsibilities to the people of Hong Kong has long been 
caught up in its pretensions and shifting position on the world stage, as well as in its 
diplomatic relations with PRC.  
 
Decolonising citizenship (and migration) 
My analysis is inspired by recent scholarship that shows how citizenship and the nation-
state were forged at the expense of other peoples and places, reinforcing, exacerbating, and 
institutionalising global inequalities in the process. On a very simple level, this scholarship 
shows that constructing a national political community necessarily requires the exclusion of 
others. The construction of nation-states, their borders and symbolic boundaries of 
belonging play a significant role in sustaining global asymmetries of power. 
 
The vanguard of such scholarship was Ayelet Shachar’s (2009) work The Birthright Lottery: 
Citizenship and Global Inequality, which laid bare the relationship between citizenship and 




framed as practices intended to restrict membership. In contrast to the presentation of 
citizenship as an inclusive leveller, she demonstrated the case for an alternative 
understanding that identified citizenship as a birthright privilege, where those born outside 
wealthy states were excluded from the privileges that accrue to citizenship of these states.  
 
Taking a decolonial perspective, Manuela Boatcă and Julia Roth stress that citizenship and 
gender are ‘the most decisive factors in accounting for these extreme inequalities between 
individuals in poor and rich countries in the twenty-first century’ (2016: 198). They draw 
attention to the coloniality of citizenship to make visible the inequalities of race and gender 
established through colonialism that endure in the contemporary global citizenship regime, 
where not all citizenships are created equal. This tension continues in the present-day, 
colonial entanglements enduring in the way that European countries relate to their (former) 
colonial possessions (Boatcă, 2021b). 
 
Reconceptualising citizenship and migration in these ways draws attention to the exclusions 
and dispossessions at the heart of the construction of citizenship and the national polity 
(Bhambra, 2015; Boatcă, 2020, 2021a). As Gurminder Bhambra highlights, this makes it 
urgent to reconstruct sociological understandings of citizenship and migration:  
 
[T]he exclusions and modes of subjugation that provided the context for the emergence 
of particular ideas of equal citizenship need to be recognized as integral to those forms 
today … [C]itizenship itself needs to be rethought in the context of its wider history, its 
connected histories and sociologies, and new conceptual forms developed from those 





Bhambra’s connected sociologies approach, and Boatcă’s (2021a) recent conceptualisation 
of the coloniality of citizenship foreground the struggles that produced the modern 
institution of citizenship. This was a process that cast aside some peoples, depriving them of 
rights and at the same time producing global inequalities that continue to drive migration in 
the present day (Boatcă and Roth, 2016; Boatcă, 2021a, 2021b). Quite simply, the sorting of 
the world’s population into those with citizenship in wealthy nation-states, while those in 
the former and continuing colonial possessions are dealt a significantly worse hand, shapes 
the contemporary political economy of migration. As Lucy Mayblin and Joe Turner argue:  
 
Colonialism continues to condition why, how and where people move, just as it shapes 
the forms of knowledge we have about what migration is … as well as the fact that 
colonialism produced the forms of racialized management that control ‘migration’. 
(2021: 203) 
 
Foregrounding the historical processes that have determined who is granted and who is 
deprived of citizens’ rights offers a way to make newly visible the relationships between 
modernity and colonialism that underscore current articulations of citizenship.  
 
While the global inequalities institutionalised through the production of nation-states are 
the headlines, this was a process that in some cases resulted in differential rights within 
those nominally cast as nationals, certain populations ambiguously positioned with some 
but not all the rights of citizens. As Ann Laura Stoler (2016) has argued, while presented as 




membership and belonging are evidence of the continuation of imperial forms of 
governance. Writing about the processes that confer limited rights on some citizens in the 
United States, she traces the historical thread that links the exclusion of Native Americans 
from the polity to the limited rights of those born in its overseas possessions to highlight 
that exception is by design.  
 
Imperial discourses have framed these as unique cases, but they are only “exceptions” in 
a context in which such exceptions are a norm. Assuming that agents of empire were 
intent on clarifying borders, establishing “order,” and reducing zones of ambiguity 
misses a crucial point. They were equally invested in, exploited, and demonstrated 
strong stakes in the proliferation of geopolitical gray zones, destabilizing and shattering 
the common sense of who belonged. (2016: 196) 
 
The continuing differentiation within citizenship regimes and the ambiguities that this 
reproduces are a reminder of the ongoing colonial entanglements in today’s citizenship 
formations. In the next section, I sketch what thinking with the coloniality of citizenship 
offers to understandings of the construction, formation and institutionalisation of British 
citizenship and its others. 
 
The coloniality of British citizenship and its others 
When citizenship was first introduced into British legislation in the 1948 British Nationality 
Act (BNA 1948), it was imperial in its scope. At this time, my grandmother, born in Hong 
Kong, and my grandfather, born in Wiltshire (UK), shared a status as Citizens of the UK and 




free movement into the United Kingdom. However, as increasing numbers of citizens from 
the colonies started to arrive in the UK seeking work and accommodation, the Government 
established immigration controls to stem these population movements (Dummett and Nicol, 
1990; Paul, 1997; Hampshire, 2005; Hansen, 2000; Karatani, 2003). From the 1962 
Commonwealth Immigration Act onwards, immigration legislation made those from the 
colonies aliens for the purposes of immigration control, and deportable if they committed 
criminal offences in the UK. It was not until the 1981 British Nationality Act (BNA 1981), 
which repealed the right of such imperial citizens to enter and settle in the UK, that 
nationality legislation followed suit.  
 
As Reiko Karatani (2003) emphasises, BNA 1981 offered the first (legal) definition mapping 
British citizenship exclusively onto the UK. Former Citizens of the Colonies were reclassified 
as British Dependent Territory Citizens (BDTC) and British Overseas Citizens (BOC). 
Importantly, these statuses granted them fewer attendant rights than those held by British 
citizens. It was through this act that my grandmother’s four siblings became BDTC—Hong 
Kong being the largest of the dependent territories covered by this legislation. My 
grandmother, married to my UK-born grandfather but living in Hong Kong, had become a 
British citizen by that stage, a status that gave her enhanced rights in British law contingent 
on her personal circumstances. Her siblings would have none of these rights.  
 
Randall Hansen (2000) argues that the citizenship categories introduced through the BNA 
1981—BDTC, BOC—sought to put an end to the legal ambiguity which meant that so-called 
citizens were migrants when they sought entry to the UK. Such categorical changes may 




legal challenges, but they did little to reduce the ambiguity of a status that in name suggests 
citizenship but in practice offers limited or no access to the rights enjoyed by citizens. I 
argue that the reclassification of these citizens had the further effect of institutionalising the 
coloniality of citizenship that had already crept into British legislation through its earlier 
immigration controls. Indeed, the new categories introduced through BNA 1981 and later 
amendments follow a similar trajectory to those Stoler (2016) highlights in the US, in that 
these were ambiguous by design, their origins in colonial practices of racial categorisation 
(see also El-Enany, 2020).  
 
Examining Britain’s citizenship-migration regime, Devyani Prabhat has argued that 
contemporary legal inequalities, and notably racial inequalities, reveal a ‘legal archaeology 
of empire’ (2020: 175). She also draws attention the work of ‘exception’ within this regime. 
In a context where commonplace understandings of British citizenship see it as enduring 
and immutable, categorical changes in status are deemed exceptional but necessary (e.g., 
those brought to light by the Windrush deportation scandal, Brexit, and the consequent EU 
settlement scheme). As she argues elsewhere, ‘exceptional measures can become 
increasingly commonplace and result in control of new populations because of changing 
geopolitics and the re-assertion of national sovereignty’ (Prabhat, 2019: 215).  
 
The colonial logics that recategorised those racialised others from Britain’s colonies as 
migrants reverberate through contemporary nationality legislation. As I reveal below, the 
ambiguous and exceptional status of Hong Kongers—past and present—is the example par 





Brexit and immigration reform: 'good migrants' and the foundations of 'Global Britain' 
My grandmother died in 2015, just a year before the UK’s Brexit referendum. If she had 
been alive at the end of 2020, she would have lost the right to free movement within the 
European Union (EU) that she had enjoyed as a British citizen, but which had never been 
extended to her siblings who had no link to the UK. Once again, this signals the 
differentiated rights and entitlements institutionalised in British nationality legislation. 
While Brexit did not directly impact on the rights and entitlements of BN(O)s, the 
immigration reform brought about in its wake, the decade-long ‘Hostile Environment’—the 
UK’s self-proclaimed ‘tough on immigration’ approach—and increasingly restrictive 
immigration controls, set the stage for claims that the HK BN(O) visa is an exception to the 
norm.  
 
The (marginal) success of the Leave campaign in the 2016 referendum on the future of 
Britain’s relationship with the EU was mobilised as the vox populi driving successive 
Conservative governments to deliver Brexit, framed as ending free movement. It is the 
legislation and measures taken to these ends, which are now celebrated as evidence of a 
‘Global Britain’ that has ‘taken back control’ of its borders, that are particularly pertinent 
here, notably the Immigration and Social Security Coordination Act (EU Withdrawal) 2020 
(ISSCA 2020). This repealed Freedom of Movement, laying the groundwork for citizens of EU 
member states seeking to enter the UK from 31 December 2020 onwards to be subject to 
the UK’s immigration controls. It has also been a vehicle for substantial and far-reaching 
immigration reform. The accompanying policy statement outlined a future points-based 
immigration system, which the UK Government presented as a way to make immigration a 




income thresholds, lowered for those coming to the UK to work in shortage occupations and 
those with PhD level qualifications, and removed for those coming to work in the NHS and 
education (provided that they are paid in line with national pay scales). While it is presented 
by its advocates as levelling up, this supposed liberalisation of immigration in Britain has 
been achieved at the expense of the liberal approach to migration that underpinned free 
movement and which had exempted EU citizens from the UK’s immigration controls (and 
British citizens exempt from such controls in EU member states).2 To my mind, this 
expanded scope of the UK’s migration legislation and policy signal that on balance it is 
better understood as levelling down. 
 
The rationale and modelling that led to the production of ISSCA 2020 emphasises the 
benefits of controlled and circumscribed immigration to the British state and economy,. 
Undoubtedly, some sectors of the labour market and individuals will find themselves judged 
to be on the right side of this new criteria. However, reducing migration to a process of 
balancing the books ignores how this has been shaped by political, social, and ideological 
struggles. Recognising how it is caught up in these struggles, sheds new light on the work 
that the image of the ‘good migrant’ for ‘Global Britain’, stripped back to questions of their 
value to the economy, whether through skill or income might be doing. Such individuals are 
welcomed as contributors to Britain’s post-Brexit prosperity but in return receive few to 
none of the protections awarded to citizens, often with no recourse to public funds and 
their access to the National Health Service (NHS) contingent on paying a surcharge.  
 
As Members of Parliament debated the bill which would become ISSCA 2020, simultaneous 




the people of Hong Kong in consequence of Chinese reforms in the region.  
 
The Hong Kong BN(O) visa in context  
In July 2020, judging the imposition of the National Security Law in HKSAR as ‘a clear breach 
of the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration’ (HO 2020, CP280, foreword, para 2), the Home 
Office released a policy statement that altered the entitlements of BN(O)s by announcing 
changes to migration legislation and policy to introduce a bespoke visa route. While the 
immigration bill had been fiercely contested, there was an extraordinary degree of cross-
party and cross-house support for the UK Government’s plan to provide a route to residency 
and citizenship for the people of Hong Kong.  
 
The HK BN(O) Visa, introduced on 31 January 2021, is a designated immigration route for 
BN(O)s ordinarily resident in HKSAR, the UK, Jersey, Guernsey, and the Isle of Man (and their 
dependents) to live, work and study in the UK. The status of British National (Overseas 
(BN(O)), on which eligibility for this new visa rests, was introduced through amendments to 
the 1981 British Nationality Act as a result of the JD. This status was the solution developed 
to accommodate those residents of Hong Kong who would automatically become Chinese 
citizens on 1 July 1997.3 It was a closed category, explicitly not transferrable to descendants, 
attesting to the British nationality of its holders and their right to residence in Hong Kong, 
but excluding them from right of abode in the UK.  
 
At the time of writing, the HK BN(O) visa gives BN(O)s relatively favourable terms of 
settlement by comparison with those seeking entry into the UK through standard 




exemptions with different conditions from standard work visa routes (the longstanding UK 
Ancestry visa is most similar in terms of its provisions and route to settlement). The 
eligibility criteria for the new visa relies on applicants being able to demonstrate that they 
can accommodate and support themselves in the UK for six months and that in addition to 
the visa fee they can cover the Immigration Health Surcharge. Unlike other migration routes 
there is no requirement for a minimum or guaranteed income. Applicants can apply from 
the UK or HKSAR, for a fee of £180 per applicant for a 30-month visa or £250 per applicant 
for a 5-year visa. The immigration health surcharge is set at £1560 for 30 months and £3120 
for five years, with reduced charges for those under the age of eighteen. In line with current 
legislation, the policy statement also makes clear that after 5 years in the UK on the HK 
BN(O) visa, BN(O)s will be able to apply for Indefinite Leave to Remain (ILR). After a year 
with ILR status, they will become eligible for citizenship by entitlement.  
 
Prior to the introduction of the scheme, the UK’s Border Force officers had been issued with 
guidance permitting them to grant ‘Leave Outside the Rules’ to BN(O)s, a provision that was 
extended until the route became fully digital. Between 5 July 2020 and 13 January 2021, 
approximately 7000 BN(O)s and their dependents entered through this route (Home Office 
News Team, 2021). Estimates of the number of people who might be eligible for this scheme 
range from the publicly announced figure of 2.9 million people eligible for BN(O) passports 
(Home Office News Team, 2021), to the 5.4 million people with BN(O) status (including 
family members who normally live with them) in the Home Office Impact Assessment.4 
However, this leaves a substantial population in Hong Kong, whose current population is 7.5 
million—including many of those born after 1997—ineligible for this scheme. The policy 




and draw attention to the existing routes in the UK’s managed migration regime that remain 
open to non-BN(O) citizens of HKSAR. For younger HKSAR citizens, the demographic 
disproportionately involved in Hong Kong’s pro-democracy uprisings, they stress that the 
Tier 5 Youth Mobility Scheme remains open. But as Elsa Oomen (2020) has pointed out, this 
is a time-limited visa (2 years) that explicitly precludes settlement and relies on bilateral 
arrangements between the UK and HKSAR. As such, it is not comparable with the new terms 
offered to BN(O)s seeking residence in the UK. For younger protestors without BN(O) status, 
for whom this new route to settlement is largely out of reach, their available options include 
applying for asylum or entering the UK through its standard immigration routes.    
 
As with many other immigration routes, the cost of entry will limit the number of people 
who take advantage of it. Perhaps unremarkably, it will be wealthier and older HKSAR 
residents who can afford the initial fees. One concession that might offset this upfront cost 
is that it allows those in possession of the visa but on a low income to apply for access to 
benefits to meet housing need, essential living costs, and child well-being, a provision 
supported through the Hong Kong BN(O) integration programme, a dedicated support 
package of £43 million. In the first quarter of 2021, 34,300 applications were made to this 
visa scheme (Home Office 2021).  
 
The HK BN(O) visa and its relatively generous provisions stand out as significant exceptions 
in the wider context of an increasingly restrictive immigration regime. As I discuss in more 
detail below, rethinking the Hong Kongers’ exceptional position in Britain’s current 
citizenship-migration nexus in the context of the longer history of their status in immigration 





Recategorising the Hong Kongers through transition 
It is almost a cliché to stress the exceptionality of Hong Kong. Its much-lauded economic 
success meant that ‘the region had become more economically advanced than most 
independent countries’ (Carroll, 2007: 7) by the time its sovereignty was handed over to PRC 
in 1997. An awkward exception to the norms and seeming to run counter to prevailing 
analyses, colonial Hong Kong has been largely absent in studies of British imperialism. In 
Britain’s other colonies, Britain’s decolonisation—the political process through which it 
shifted from empire to nation-state—was caught up with local struggles for independence 
and sovereignty that meant that most of Britain’s former territories became independent 
states. Self-determination was never on the cards for Hong Kong. Through the Convention 
of Peking, the New Territories were leased to Britain for a time-limited period of 99 years. 
But it was how the New Territories were managed in British law—as a territorial extension 
of Hong Kong and its jurisdiction—that called the long-term future of the colony into 
question and laid the foundations for sovereignty of the region to be transferred to China 
once the lease was up (Tsang 2007). Even at the Sino-British negotiations over the future of 
the HK taking place in the 1980s, the Hong Kongers did not have a seat at the table. This 
makes Hong Kong an ambiguous case; as such it rarely features in mainstream scholarship 
focussed on Britain’s decolonisation. But it is the fact that Hong Kong is also largely 
unremarked upon in research focussed on the development of immigration and nationality 
law in the UK (see Jowett et al. 1995; Mark 2019 for notable exceptions) that is of particular 
interest to me here.  
 




of Hong Kong have been upheld as exceptional. The 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act 
introduced immigration controls for Hong Kongers, along with other CUKCs born outside the 
UK. Nevertheless, the preferential quota of Hong Kongers issued with work vouchers that 
allowed them to live and work in the UK in the late 1960s meant that they accounted for 
1500 of the 4000 vouchers issued to non-patrial citizens (Dummett and Nicol, 1990: 206).  
 
In what follows, I recover Britain’s relationship to the Hong Kongers as rendered through 
BNA 1981, in the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacres, and through the 
negotiations over the future of Hong Kong that resulted in the JD and paved the way for the 
‘one-country, two systems’ solution and the development of Basic Law, HK’s de facto 
constitution. In this way, I lay bare the continual reworking of the Hong Kongers’ exceptional 
status in British immigration and nationality law.  
 
Hong Kongers and the 1981 British Nationality Act  
My entry point is the BNA 1981. At the time that the Bill that would lead the establishment 
of this act was making its way through the parliamentary process, Hong Kong was the 
largest of Britain’s remaining dependent territories with the result that its non-patrial CUKCs 
constituted the majority of those reclassified as BDTCs. Casting former colonial citizens as 
‘other’ was integral to Britain’s new political project of belonging in the post-decolonisation 
era. As Karatani concludes, ‘[t]he main purpose of the act itself was only to link the legal 
status of British citizenship with the right of entry and abode’ (2003: 185), a process that 






Writing in 1981, Ann Dummett of the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants (JCWI) 
commenced her critique of BNA 1981 by highlighting concerns originating in other parts of 
the empire about this reformulation of nationality:  
 
It is because they have recognised this underlying isolationist character of the Act that 
two dependencies in particular, Hong Kong and Gibraltar, have been vehemently 
opposed to it. Their governments have strong political reasons for wanting to appear 
British in their neighbours’ eyes, and their objections have related less to specific 
provisions than to a sense of rejection, of distance replacing close association. 
(Dummett, 1981: 223)  
 
As Chi-kwan Mark (2019) stresses, for Hong Kong’s elites investment in changes to British 
nationality legislation at this time was about their stake in the future of the region. By 
lobbying the UK Government to protect the rights of Hong Kong citizens, they hoped to 
remind Britain of its obligations. Advocating for continued political and economic autonomy 
of the region post-1997, these elites were aware that they needed Britain to take up this 
baton if they were to have any chance of success. As such, the introduction of the new legal 
status of BDTC, introduced by the BNA 1981 in advance of the Sino-British negotiations, was 
an unwelcome signal that the UK was further distancing itself from its obligations to the 
people of Hong Kong (see also Jowett et al. 1995).  
 
Writing after the completion of the Sino-British negotiations, Dummett and Nicol (1990) 
further considered the significance of Hong Kong in the development and implementation 




British nationality which would give right of abode in the United Kingdom to the 2.6 million 
British Chinese in Hong Kong’ (1990: 242; emphasis added). British politicians feared that 
extending the right of abode to Hong Kongers would result in mass and uncontrollable 
migration from the region in anticipation of China’s sovereignty. As such, the fate of Hong 
Kongers in British nationality law was caught up in the politicisation of migration in Britain.  
 
From the Chinese perspective, the fact that Hong Kongers were Chinese nationals shaped 
this decision. If the UK had issued full British citizenship to the Hong Kongers, as Portugal 
had done in the case of Macao (Mendes 2013), the forthcoming negotiations might have 
taken a different turn. The ink was barely dry on BNA 1981 when the Sino-British 
negotiations commenced. In consequence of the JD, the prior status of BDTC was 
superseded by that of BN(O) on 1 July 1997.  
 
BN(O) status was little more than a nominal shift in British nationality law, offering no more, 
no less than had the previous BDTC status. It gave those eligible a passport but made clear 
that they had no right to abode in the UK, leaving them subject to British immigration 
control should they seek residence and employment there. It offered them access to British 
consular assistance when travelling to a third country—i.e., not China or Hong Kong. As it 
was a closed, non-transferrable category, it was anticipated that Britain’s obligations to the 
region’s residents would gradually die out. As such, the establishment of BN(O) status trod a 
fine line between Britain’s continuing obligations to its former subjects and China’s pending 
sovereignty of the region.   
 




But later that decade the ambiguity of this legal status would be shown up for what it was. 
In 1989, the imposition of martial law in Beijing that led to the Tiananmen Square massacre 
was deeply felt among the people of Hong Kong. They took to the streets to express their 
opposition to Beijing’s actions, the largest demonstrations the colonial city had ever seen. 
Their chants— ‘Today China, Tomorrow Hong Kong’—made visible their anxieties about 
Hong Kong’s future.  
 
For Dummett and Nicol (1990: 249-51), the British Government’s response to these events 
was particularly revealing:  
 
By defining certain people as British, while denying them the rights associated in 
international practice with nationality, the British Government tried to have things both 
ways, to look as though obligations were being honoured while intending not to honour 
them. When the test came, in June 1989, with the Tienanmen [sic] Square massacre in 
Beijing, and the subsequent demand from the people of Hong Kong for British 
citizenship with right of abode in the United Kingdom, the weakness of this attempt was 
exposed. (Dummett and Nicol 1990: 251) 
 
While the British Government had repealed the BDTC status of Falkland Islanders and 
Gibraltarians, replacing this with British citizenship permitting the right to abode in the UK, 
this would not be the outcome for the people of Hong Kong. Instead, the concession the 
Government made was to introduce the British Nationality (Hong Kong) Act (1990). This 
offered full citizenship—and, with it the right to abode in Britain—through a points-based 




the colony’s continuing economic success. For historian Kathleen Paul (1997: 186) the logic 
behind this was cynical. The emigration of Hong Kong citizens in the wake of the Tiananmen 
Square massacre (notably, to Australia, Canada, and New Zealand) was seen as a potential 
threat to Hong Kong’s economy. As Jowett et al. (1995) stress, the Government were keen 
to highlight that this provision was not an immigration bill. Rather, offering ‘passports to 
stay’ the British Government hoped that key personnel would continue to service the colony 
until 1997.  
 
Hansen (2000: 218) interprets this exceptional provision as offering a counter-narrative to 
claims that British nationality law was becoming increasingly restrictive. However, the 
comparison between the inclusive provisions made for the white British populations of the 
Falklands and Gibraltar and the exclusive provisions made for the British Chinese of Hong 
Kong exposes the sharpening of racial lines, making visible once more the racialised and 
classed hierarchies in British nationality legislation (Dummett and Nicol, 1990; Paul, 1997). 
 
Through the convergence of changes in British nationality law with the transfer of 
sovereignty of the region to China, Hong Kongers were re-categorised as nationals not 
citizens. By the time the BN(O) status was introduced, only one of my grandmother’s siblings 
was left in Hong Kong. All the others had emigrated through family reunion (joining their 
children who had settled overseas) to Australia, Canada, and (in my grandmother’s case) the 
UK. Her one brother remaining in Hong Kong woke up on 1 July 1997 as BN(O). 
 
I argue that the BN(O) classification attested to Britain’s continuing obligations to its former 




not considered part of Britain. In what follows, I consider how the revitalisation of Britain’s 
interest in the Hong Kongers and its responsibilities to them in the present-day, is similarly 
caught up in questions of global political economy. In this way, I call into question the 
seeming exceptionality of concessions developed in British migration policy to 
accommodate those holding the status of British National (Overseas).  
 
Britain and the Hong Kongers from handover to post-Brexit 
While Hong Kong and its people appeared in early scholarship that evaluated the 
development of the BNA 1981, it is notable that in later scholarship they become 
increasingly marginalised, appearing only in footnotes or sparingly in the texts. Similarly, 
after 1997 Hong Kong and its residents largely slipped out of sight of British politicians, 
parliamentarians, and policy makers. 
 
British reactions to developments in HKSAR 
[A]n ongoing series of controversies over political and constitutional reform and the 79-
day “Occupy” movement in Hong Kong in autumn 2014 brought the city’s politics back 
to international attention in a way not seen since 1997. (Summers, 2016: 2, emphasis 
added) 
Over the course of the 2010s, political protest in Hong Kong drew international attention 
and with it the renewed interest of the UK Government. As Tim Summers (2016) identifies, 
the six-monthly reports on the development of Hong Kong under Chinese sovereignty 
produced by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) from 1997 onwards offer a way 
to trace how their position on Hong Kong has evolved over time. While at various points 




was a turning point.  
Since 2014 the FCO’s reports have expressed increasing concern, most notably about the 
intensification of political debate in HKSAR in response to political and constitutional reform 
and the dogged issue of universal suffrage. Following a series of events including the 
involuntary removal of bookseller Lee Po to mainland China without due process under 
HKSAR law, the second report of 2015 identified grounds for concern about whether the 
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the JD were being maintained. From 2016 onwards, the 
reports document the UK Government’s escalating concerns about the restriction of the 
basic freedoms of the people of HKSAR. I stress here PRC’s response to these reports, which 
has in recent years escalated from statements of disapproval, to repeated reminders that 
the JD is a historic document that gives the UK no power to supervise or monitor its affairs 
in Hong Kong, and an explicit reprimand of the UK Government for foreign interference in 
internal affairs.  
 
The escalation of political and constitutional reform in HKSAR since 2019 has not passed 
unremarked. From the extradition law to the imposition of National Security Law, the six-
monthly reports document the PRC’s actions and how Beijing’s imposition of legislation 
undermines autonomy and democracy in HKSAR. They report politically motivated arrests 
and police brutality towards protestors. In this way, from 2014 onwards, the FCO’s reports 
laid a trail highlighting how China’s actions might constitute a breach of the JD. They also 
began to lay the groundwork for Britain’s potential response if and when new legislation 
was introduced.  
 




explicitly condemns the recent imposition of the National Security Law on the grounds that 
it undermines the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ framework. 
 
Through the imposition of the National Security Law, China has failed to live up to its 
international obligations with respect to Hong Kong. The UK Government has responded 
with a series of reasonable and proportionate measures, which reflect our vital interests 
and our long-standing commitments to the people of Hong Kong. (FCDO, 2020: p. 4, 
para. 3) 
 
The measures laid out include the HK BN(O) visa, the extension to HKSAR of the arms 
embargo, the suspension of the extradition agreement with Hong Kong and ongoing 
discussions about whether British judges should continue to sit as non-permanent judges on 
the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal. That alongside these other measures the bespoke visa 
was first mooted by the FCO rather than the Home Office, shows how it is caught up in the 
UK’s China and Hong Kong policies. The UK Government’s responses to events in HKSAR, as 
Summers (2021) argues, was reactionary rather than strategic, marking a shift from a 
foreign policy approach grounded in interests, to one organised around values.  
 
Recent discussions about Hong Kong in the UK parliament also demonstrate this; the rights 
and freedoms of the people of Hong Kong have been raised alongside human rights abuses 
in China—most significantly those directed towards the majority Muslim population of the 
Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region—and calls for international intervention. The timing of 
the announcement of the UK’s measures also coincided with the decision to strip Huawei, 




demonstrate the escalation of tensions in Sino-British relations; Britain’s approach to China 
is increasingly hostile, the rights of Hong Kongers a pawn within them.  
 
Such foreign policy considerations are important in demonstrating the different scales and 
relationships in which concerns over HKSAR are caught up; they also highlight the 
undoubtedly geopolitical issues that have led to the emergence of this bespoke visa route.  
 
Hong Kongers and Brexit Britain’s immigration controls 
While this history is briefly sketched, my intention here is to demonstrate the political and 
ideological struggles that might help to make sense of the UK Government’s recent 
concessions for those with BN(O) status. To do so is not to excuse, or to divert attention 
from urgent questions of democracy in PRC and HKSAR, but to ask instead what the UK 
Government’s involvement reveals about ‘Global Britain’.  
 
What it shows is how an anachronistic and ambiguous legal status, an afterlife of empire 
that until now had been glaringly empty of significance for its holders, has been infused with 
new meaning. Indeed, in the debate over the new plan for immigration, Home Secretary 
Priti Patel held up the HK BN(O) visa as evidence of the Conservative Government’s ‘fair and 
generous’ approach to immigration: 
 
From the expulsion of Ugandan Asians … to supporting campaigners fleeing political 
persecution in Hong Kong—that is the record of Conservatives when it comes to 
humanitarianism. Under the Conservative leadership of this Government, the United 




on their own liberty and personal freedoms, and this new plan will build on that. (HC (24 
March 2021) 691: 922-3) 
 
Simply, the claim is that the government is morally obliged to offer this route in the light of 
PRC’s actions in HKSAR. This justifies the introduction of exceptional measures that exceed 
ordinary routes to immigration. As I outlined previously, exception has always been the 
norm when it comes to Britain’s relationship with the Hong Kongers. The HK BN(O) visa is 
framed as Britain providing a haven for its former colonial subjects—at times referred to 
misleadingly (if tellingly) as BN(O) citizens—but has undoubtedly colonialist overtones. 
Indeed, this point is not lost on some of those on the ground in Hong Kong: ‘The response in 
Hong Kong was mixed, with some welcoming the announcement and others criticising the 
UK for interfering and for its lack of confidence in Hong Kong’s future’ (Summers, 2021:7).  
 
I argue against taking on face value the idea that the HK BN(O) visa is an exception. Instead, 
attention should be turned to the role that the discourse and rhetoric about this new 
bespoke route play within the Hostile Environment. Its timing makes the HK BN(O) visa the 
ideal poster child for a ‘Global Britain’ that has ‘taken back control’ of its borders. 
Government announcements and media reports about the scheme recycle longstanding 
stereotypes that present the Hong Kong Chinese as hardworking and entrepreneurial, a 
ready-made model minority who should be welcomed with open arms. As Jeevan Vasagar 
wrote in a recent opinion piece,  
 
… the “good migrant” narrative coalescing around the Hong Kong Chinese is risky for 




combine the imperial nostalgia that helped power Brexit, an importing of US 
conservative politics, and a racialised caricature of why the Asian tiger economies – 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea – have been so successful. (2021; see 
also Pang 2021) 
 
In a context where the UK Government is keen to demonstrate it has ‘taken back control’, 
the scope of this visa is unusual. A bespoke scheme such as this demonstrates that the 
Government are now in a position to choose which particular migrants will be beneficial to 
‘Global Britain’. The choice to extend these provisions to a population whose status is 
evidence of the coloniality of British citizenship points to the persistence of colonial 
entanglements of post-Brexit Britain.  
 
Beyond the concession in immigration law that this offers, offering these provisions 
additionally allows Britain to flex its muscles on the international stage. I argue that these 
provisions are thoroughly entangled with Britain’s shifting position on the world stage in 
consequence of Brexit, while also carefully balancing the JD. Indeed, the discursive 
wrangling accompanying the introduction of this visa that emanates from both China and 
the UK, which is broadcast through an array of domestic (UK, Hong Kong, and China) and 
international media channels illustrates what may be at stake.  
 
Conclusion 
British immigration and nationality legislation have long been sites of colonial 
entanglements. Since the 1960s, through policy and legislation, a near continuous process of 




grandmother’s siblings had their rights in British law eroded long before 1997. To my mind, 
there is no end to this process in sight. Coloniality remains at the core of Britain’s 
citizenship-migration nexus. As sociologists of citizenship and migration, we need to shift 
our gaze to the historical production of contemporary citizen-migration regimes and global 
inequalities. In a context in which former citizens have been made into migrants, how might 
this shift our understandings of the routes to social justice for these populations? 
 
Returning to the Hong Kongers, I argue that we need to question what the presentation of 
this case as exceptional conceals from view. On the surface, the HK BN(O) visa scheme 
appears to contradict the broader context of the ‘Hostile Environment’ and contemporary 
immigration reform; it is only by unpicking the coloniality of British citizenship that this may 
be revealed as otherwise. It is a reminder of how imperial forms of governance underscore 
present-day legislation; the HK BN(O) visa is a small concession with limited effect for those 
whose status has been constantly downgraded.  
 
Beyond this, the ambiguity by design of the BN(O) status meant it could be infused with new 
significance in the context of a growing crisis in the Sino-British relationship, giving rise to 
the HK BN(O) visa. This revitalisation of Britain’s interest in its self-claimed moral 
responsibilities, obligations, and commitments to the people of Hong Kong has further 
significance in the context of Britain’s post-Brexit position on the world stage. Through this 
lens, its provisions for the Hong Kongers emerge as the exception that proves the rule that 
Britain has taken back control of its borders and is able to pick and choose who might be 
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1. The 1948 British Nationality Act (BNA 1948) recategorized Hong Kong’s British 
subjects as Citizens of the UK and Colonies (CUKC). Through the Commonwealth 
Immigration Act 1962, the right to abode in the UK was removed from those CUKC 
from Hong Kong, as they were made aliens for the purposes of immigration control. 
Through the 1981 BNA they were recategorized as British Dependent Territories 
Citizens (BDTC) and then as British Nationals (Overseas) when sovereignty of Hong 




2. As I have written elsewhere (Benson and O’Reilly 2020; Benson 2021; see also 
https://brexitbritsabroad.org)  the 1.2 million British citizens living in the EU who 
benefited from Freedom of Movement are a lesser known in the story of migration 
and Brexit.   
3. Non-ethnic Chinese residents were able to apply to become British Dependent 
Territories Citizens (BDTC) if they did not already hold this status.   
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